Criminal organizational insider computer abuse (ICA) 
Introduction
Although hackers and viruses often dominate the media headlines regarding security breaches, information systems (IS) security practitioners also have to deal with a range of threats from inside their organizations. Long before the international incidents involving Private Manning (U.S. military intelligence leaks to Wikileaks) and Edward Snowden (The U.S. National Security Agency document leaks), experts concurred that organizational insiders represent the greatest threats to IS security, and this assessment applies equally today (Crossler et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013) . The threat exists because insiders require broad access to the most valuable organizational information to perform their jobs effectively, and they often cannot be controlled through technical means alone (Vance et al., 2013) . Moreover, such people literally have "insider" information not available externally that can be tempting to use for personal gain through such avenues as insider trading, fraud, and selling trade secrets (Cummings et al., 2012) .
Attempts to gather accurate statistics on this pervasive insider problem are hampered by the fact that organizations often fail to report such crimes because they fear reputational damage, drawing attention to potential weaknesses, losing competitive advantage, and exposing privacy issues. Nonetheless, industry surveys provide some insight into the prevalence of insider computer abuse (ICA). The 2014 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) global report on organizational security (2014) documented an increase of 51 percent in security budgets and a 25 percent increase in security incidents from 2013. Moreover, approximately 31 percent of security incidents likely were committed by current employees, 27 percent by former employees, 16 percent by current consultants or service providers, and 13 percent by former consultants or service providers. The survey makes clear that the insider threat is worsening over time and remains to be addressed sufficiently. Summarizing global concerns on the threat from insiders, chief security officer Michael A. Mason noted, "I see the insider threat looming larger in my windshield than in the past. . .. Our problems are more human than technological" (PwC, 2014, p. 8) . More recently, PwC, CSO Magazine, The CERT Division 1 of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, and The United States Secret Service all teamed up to study organizational security issues. Aside from finding that approximately 23 percent of cybercrimes are committed by organizational insiders, that these acts are exceedingly expensive and damaging, that 76 percent of CEOs are more worried about cybersecurity than the year before, that security incidents went up 28 percent in 2014 from 2013, and that spending on cybersecurity has greatly increased, they grimly concluded that progress on thwarting such abuses has largely stalled (Anonymous, 2015) .
Despite the substantial threat that ICA poses to organizations and the dire extant situation that efforts to thwart it have floundered, the response from IS security researchers can be described as "modest." The few studies include Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2004a; Lowry et al., 2014; Peace et al., 2003; Posey et al., 2011; Willison et al., 2018; and Workman, 2007;  whereas, scores of studies have examined noncriminal security intentions and behaviors. Appendix A provides a complete review of the ICA literature. Indeed, given the paucity of such studies, recent work has urged that greater focus be placed on the insider threat (Crossler et al., 2013; Lowry et al., 2017a; Posey et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013) . Mahmood et al. (2010) , for example, likened the relationship between those responsible for enhancing security and those attempting to bypass it to the white hat/black hat (good guy/bad guy) distinction in Wild West movies. They noted how the IS security discipline has been dominated by "good guy/white hat" approaches, which address issues such as employee compliance to IS security policies. As an alternative, they called for IS security academics to consider the "harder-toreach black hat" subjects research. Such studies, they argued, will allow the development of more effective countermeasures based on better understandings of offender behavior. Even still, when considering "black hats" most researchers deal with external actors such as hackers, and largely overlook malicious insiders who can do just as much damage or more.
To aid our examination of the insider threat, we discuss, challenge, and improve upon the existing literature by developing the extended security action cycle (ESAC) framework by Willison and Warkentin (2013) , which they adapted from Straub and Welke (1998) (see Figure 1 ). Willison and Warkentin (2013) argued for the need to examine not only intention to undertake ICA and deterrence of such behavior, but also phenomena that temporally precede these areas. Specifically, they advocated examination of the thought processes of a potential rogue member of staff as well as their interaction within the organizational context. Furthermore, they asserted that, in certain situations, such interactions might influence these thought processes and, consequently, influence the efficacy of deterrence safeguards.
Although we agree with the need to examine behavior which precedes the deterrence influence, we argue that the Willison and Warkentin (2013) article and related studies have only partially conceptualized the offender decision-making processes for ICA. This is a compelling opportunity we address in this manuscript. The existing studies have assumed that the only decision made is regarding the crime itself, often using the intention construct as a proxy for actual behavior. However, this understanding of ICA runs contrary to an established body of criminological research, which illustrates that an offender makes a series of choices in the criminal decision-making process (Blumstein, 1986; Blumstein et al., 1988; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 2013; Paternoster, 1989a Paternoster, , 1989b . Research by Blumstein (1986) and Blumstein et al. (1988) , for example, highlighted the decisions made in a criminal career. In this context, the term "career" is not referring to the earnings involved to sustain a criminal's livelihood, but rather the sequence of decisions made in a period in which an offender is criminally active. Thus, there will be choices regarding the beginning (i.e., onset), the duration (i.e., career length) and cessation (i.e., the ending of criminal activities). Coupled with these decisions are choices made regarding the frequency of offending, such as the number of times a criminal commits an offence.
In a similar vein, Clarke and Cornish (1985) and Cornish and Clarke (2013) advanced their "rational choice perspective" (RCP) on offender decisionmaking. RCP clarifies that criminals make decisions regarding what are termed involvement and event stages. Similar to Blumstein (1986) and Blumstein et al. (1988) , the involvement stage requires offender decisions to be made regarding initial involvement, continuation, and desistance. Moreover, the event stage involves offender choices leading up to and during the criminal act.
With specific relevance to the current discussion are the "initial involvement" and event stages. Obvious parallels exist between the RCP and IS security research on ICA. However, the RCP acknowledges the initial involvement stage. RCP explains that if an individual becomes motivated during this stage and decides that future criminal behavior is the most suitable course of action, then he/she will have reached a state of "readiness." As Clarke and Cornish (1985) state, "Readiness involves rather more than receptiveness: it implies that the individual has actually contemplated this form of crime as a solution to his needs and decided that under the right circumstances he would commit the offence" (p. 167). Consequently, it is only later, during the criminal event stage, that a crime will be enacted. Given that the initial involvement stage has been overlooked in IS Security research, it perhaps has wrongly been assumed that any motivations are solely related to the criminal act. Such an assumption denies any consideration of why an individual would initially consider engaging in criminal activity in the first instance and the associated motivational influences. Therefore, we argue that there needs to be a clear distinction between motivational factors at the initial involvement stage and factors that would lead an individual to undertake a crime at the event stage.
The lack of consideration in IS security research for the distinction between initial involvement and event decisions indicates that the ESAC can be further improved (which we do). In their paper, Willison and Warkentin (2013) discussed "pre-kinetic" events, which temporally occur prior to deterrence influences. Thus, it is argued that three event types-namely, (1) organizational justice disgruntlement, (2) expressive motives, and (3) neutralization-influence the efficacy of deterrence safeguards. However, the ESAC model only considers these types in terms of the criminal act (i.e., the event stage). We thus argue that the model conflates aspects of the criminal decision-making process by including factors that, from an RCP, would be categorized as relating to not only the event but also the initial involvement stage. For example, organizational justice disgruntlement from an RCP would be considered a motivational influence at the initial involvement stage. Our reasoning behind this is discussed below in the section entitled "The Computer Timeline Revisited," in which we propose our revised version of the ESAC model, called The Two Stage Decision Making Process for ICA ( Figure  4) , based on the RCP.
Aside from acknowledging motivational factors at the initial involvement stage, there is also the obvious need to identify and understand them. Accordingly, we propose a framework based on the life course perspective (LCP). LCP affords a focus on time, context, process, and a framework for researching criminal phenomena. LCP encompasses a series of principles that guide LCP research, which we propose as the basis for studying motivational factors at the initial involvement stage.
In the remainder of this manuscript, we first provide further background information on ICA and the associated literature, and in doing so, we propose an improved definition of ICA. Next, we propose and advance our revised model of the ESAC, which is grounded in our observation that IS security studies on ICA have overlooked the initial involvement stage. We then address the compelling opportunity of how to identify and understand those factors that may motivate an individual at the initial involvement stage. To assist in the identification and understanding of the relevant factors, we propose a new framework based on the LCP principles. We then describe each principle and illustrate how they may be applied to the information systems (IS) context. Finally, we conclude by considering the ICA research agenda and offering three potential avenues for future studies based on our conceptual work.
Defining ICA
In this section, we first explain ICA, using the associated literature. Generally, computer abuse (CA) is the deliberate and unauthorized misuse of information system assets (Posey et al., 2011) whether by internal or external actors (Straub, 1990) . However, our focus is on internal abuse that is intentional and criminal. Most studies in this domain have considered ICA, internal computer abuse, computer abuse, and employee computer abuse to be synonymous (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009b; Herath & Rao, 2009; Lowry et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011) , but such terminological equivalence is not entirely accurate. We thus return to the literature to review the foundation of CA and ICA, propose an updated taxonomy for CA, and suggest a more precise definition of ICA.
To improve on the extant definition of ICA, we return to the work of Loch et al. (1992) who proposed the IS Security Threat Vector Taxonomy, which was revised slightly by Willison and Warkentin (2013) . We have updated this taxonomy to better account for the security conditions in today's environment, and we use this taxonomy to define further what ICA is and is not. Figure 2 depicts our updated IS Security Threat Vector Taxonomy. ICA involves employees or organizational insiders-not consumers or students. Thus, we assert that several studies about various unethical or risky computer behaviors involving consumers or students do not constitute ICA, including piracy of software and digital media (Lowry et al., 2017b; Nandedkar & Midha, 2012) ; illegal peerto-peer file sharing (Moore & McMullan, 2004) ; deviant computer behavior by students (Rogers et al., 2006) ; cyberslacking outside of work (Nandedkar & Midha, 2012) ; cyberbullying outside of work ; compulsive and deviant social networking behavior (James et al., 2017) ; organizational-level decisions to commit ethical breaches (Wall et al., 2016) ; and risky behaviors that create susceptibilities to malware, phishing, privacy violations, and identity theft (Keith et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2012; Salleh et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013) .
We consider ICA to involve only malicious behaviors conducted by employees or other insiders in an organizational context. Furthermore, ICA does not involve an external threat. External threats to IS include human sources (e.g., hackers, crackers, social engineers, phishers, and cyberterrorists) (Bachmann, 2010; Bossler & Burrus, 2011; Hansen et al., 2007; Workman, 2008) and nonhuman sources (e.g., natural disasters, malware). It should be noted that the issue of organizational insiders in undermining security has grown more complex since Loch et al. (1992) published their article. Organizations today pursue workers in more virtual and temporary roles; thus, contractors, consultants, and outside suppliers expand and complicate the category of organizational insiders. Moreover, the velocity of change in organizations has increasedtoday's employees are less likely to stay with the same organization for as long as employees of the past did-making former employees a greater threat.
We next leverage the taxonomy by Loch et al. (1992) for guidance as to when such internal threats are ICA. The key here is the intent of the IS policy violations. The taxonomy groups' intent can be organized into threat categories: (1) passive, nonvolitional noncompliance (e.g., accidental behaviors, uninformed violations, unintentional actions);
(2) volitional but not malicious noncompliance (e.g., failing to backup data, not changing passwords regularly, not signing out of the system, security lapses) (Guo et al., 2011; Jenkins et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2008) ; and (3) internal, malicious and criminal computer abuse by employees or other insiders (e.g., sabotage, data theft, fraud, and deliberate policy violations-but only those that are criminal) (e.g., Hu et al., 2011) . We consider only this latter category ICA. For the second category, we also add newer behaviors, such as nonwork related computing and cyberloafing that violates IS policies but are devoid of malicious deviant intent (e.g., surfing, personal email, shopping) (Lee et al., 2004b; Moody & Siponen, 2013) .
We supplement the third category with newer phenomena that increasingly challenge organizations. These criminal ICA behaviors include purposeful sharing or leaking of confidential organizational information or trade secrets (Smith et al., 2012) ; contravention of organizational security measures, including insider social engineering (Workman, 2007) ; and unauthorized data access or intentional access policy violations that are criminal (Hu et al., 2011) . Moreover, employees are increasingly turning to social media at work, or using work resources, to commit newer criminal acts such as sexting, cyberbullying, cyberharassment, and the like-all of which has increased exposure and liability to organizations that need to be addressed and thwarted . Aside from the obvious organizational issues that employee cyberbullying has caused, organizations are also being held legally liable for the emotional and psychological damage that their employees inflict on those outside their organization, when such harassment is conducted using organizational resources, regardless of where it is done .
Given our review of the CA and ICA literature, and the important distinctions between criminal and noncriminal security violations, we thus define ICA formally as follows: Intentional employee or otherinsider behavior involving an organization's information assets or computing infrastructure that includes purposeful, deviant, and malicious intent against the best interests of an organization or its members, and which behavior is formally considered illegal. Given this enhanced definition of ICA, it should be clear that not all violations of an organization's IS security (IS policies) constitute ICA. For example, suppose an organization's IS policies state that employees must take care to run antimalware on all email attachments. If an employee does not run anti-malware software on an email because he or she is in a hurry, this action is not considered ICA because there was no malicious intent and there is no criminal violation. However, if an employee was to forward a virus to a coworker intentionally as an act of bullying or sabotage, such an act constitutes ICA.
The Computer Abuse Timeline Revisited
Given our review and improved definition of ICA, we now revisit and propose revisions to the computer abuse timeline from the ESAC framework by Willison and Warkentin (2013) , as they adapted it from Straub and Welke (1998) (see Figure 1 ). Willison and Warkentin considered three types of "pre-kinetic" events: (1) organizational justice disgruntlement, (2) expressive motives and (3) neutralization. They argued that these three types of events impact the efficacy of deterrence safeguards. However, the ESAC model only considers these three types in terms of the criminal act (i.e., during the event stage). Accordingly, a key opportunity for improvement in the Willison and Warkentin model is that it conflates aspects of the criminal decision-making process that from an RCP would be considered to be related to the event stage, but also the initial involvement stage. For example, organizational justice disgruntlement would be considered a motivational influence at the initial involvement stage, from an RCP. It is for this reason that we propose key timeline changes for implementation, including T-3 and what precedes this point in time (see Figure 1 ).
As noted, we based the aforementioned changes to the ESAC timeline on the criminological research of Clarke and Cornish (1985) , who emphasized, "There is a fundamental distinction to be made between explaining the involvement of particular individuals in crime and explaining the occurrence of criminal events" (p. 164). Thus, Clarke and Cornish distinguished between involvement and event decisions. Involvement decisions relate to the three stages of a criminal career: An individual must make decisions about embarking on criminal activities (i.e., initial involvement), whether to continue these activities over time (i.e., continuation), and when, if at all, to cease offending (i.e., desistance). Event decisions refer to those decisions made during the commission of a crime.
Importantly, Clarke and Cornish (1985) depicted these decision stages in a series of models, using the crime of burglary in a middle-class suburb as an illustrative example. These models were viewed by Clarke and Cornish as potential "blueprints" for other researchers' theory development. Indeed, recognizing that the configuration of such models would differ according to the type of crime under consideration, Clarke and Cornish viewed these models as a foundation for the early stages of theory formulation. It is in this spirit that we draw on their work.
Of specific relevance to our essay is the initial involvement model (see Figure 3) . The model depicts the two key decision points: boxes seven (readiness) and eight (decision to commit a crime). As the model indicates, if an individual becomes motivated and decides that future criminal actions are the best way to satisfy his or her needs (box 3), then the individual will have reached a state of readiness (box 7).
This readiness implies that an individual has evaluated solutions (box 4) to these needs and identified the best course of action (box 5). Such appraisals are further influenced by an individual's moral code, self-perception, and criminal experience, as well as the extent to which he or she can plan and employ foresight (box 2). Related to these influences are what Clarke and Cornish called "background factors" (box 1), which customarily have formed the focus for criminological dispositional theories of criminality. Such theories provide accounts of how and why individuals-through the assimilation of specific social or psychological influences or the inheritance of traits-are more inclined to commit delinquent or criminal acts. It is only after an individual has become "readied" that the individual will later decide to undertake a specific crime (box 8), which will be influenced by chance events (box 6).
Importantly, the decision to commit a specific crime (box 8) relates to the event stage of the criminal decision-making process, which Clarke and Cornish depicted as a separate diagram. The event stage involves decisions and behavior regarding the actual criminal act.
Based on the distinction between the initial involvement and the event stage in offender decisionmaking, we now introduce our revised version of the ESAC (Figure 4 ). We call this revision the Two-Stage Decision-Making Process for ICA. Importantly, Figure  4 reflects the distinction between initial involvement and what we have termed the ICA event stage. Regarding the latter, and working backwards, T1 represents undetected abuse. T0 represents the moment when an insider commits actual ICA. Studies that have examined behavioral commission of ICA are uncommon, but a few do exist (Lee et al., 2004a; Lowry et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011; Workman, 2007) . T-1 involves attempts to avert ICA, known as prevention. Technical approaches to preventing ICA include system and network monitoring, passwords, authentication, and facility control. Few behavioral studies have addressed prevention approaches, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., 2006; Willison & Backhouse, 2006; . T-2 addresses behavioral intentions to commit ICA, and T-3 addresses actions to deter negative intentions from forming; such actions are known as deterrence. Some studies have researched the interplay between T-2 behavioral intentions and T-3 deterrence actions (Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2011; Peace et al., 2003) .
Given this discussion, the point at which the individual reaches a state of readiness precedes event deterrence (T-4). However, the state of readiness (T-4) is reached only if an individual decides that crime is the most suitable course of action, as opposed to the individual's needs being met through legitimate, noncriminal activities (T-5).
The individual must be driven to the point that he or she decides illegitimate activities are the best course of action. To be in a state to make such a decision, an individual must have developed motivations/needs (T-6), which further emerges because of the interactions represented by T-7 (an employee's interaction between work and family life, influenced by situational/transitory factors and current life circumstances). The reasons for this specific wording representing T-7 and how it leads an individual to T-6 are discussed in the following two sections of this manuscript.
Which Factors Motivate Individuals to a State of Readiness for ICA?
Given the crucial distinction between the initial involvement and event stages, we reveal an opportunity for IS security researchers to newly consider the specific factors that motivate individuals at the initial involvement stage of ICA (see T-7 and T-6 per Figure 4 ). In the field of criminology, Clarke and Cornish (1985) acknowledge (see Figure  3 ). These theories describe what they term background factors (see box 1 in Figure 3 ). Developed to explain how delinquents and other street criminals first choose to participate in crime, dispositional theories provide accounts of how and why individuals are more inclined to engage in acts of a delinquent or criminal nature (Agnew, 1992; Cloward & Ohlin, 2013; Hirschi, 2002) . These inclinations towards crime emerge through the assimilation of specific social factors (e.g., poor housing, low-quality education, single parents); psychological influences (e.g., mental illness); or the inheritance of traits (e.g., low self-control). However, Clarke and Cornish also noted that the extent to which these background factors are influential-and therefore the extent to which dispositional theories can help to explain initial involvement-depends on the type of crime. Clarke and Cornish (1985) provided the example of computer fraud as a case in point, arguing that background factors may be much less influential than the individual's immediate situation:
The contribution of background factors to the final decision to commit crime would be much moderated by situational and transitory influences: and for certain sorts of crime (e.g., computer fraud), the individual's background might be of much less relevance than his immediate situation. (p. 167)
The influence of situational and transitory factors on the motivations of individuals is also consistent with white-collar crime research. Unlike delinquent behavior, in which initial involvement in crime occurs early in life or during but not after adolescence (Blumstein, 1986; Piquero & Benson, 2004b) , the initial involvement for white-collar criminals generally occurs much later in life. Indeed, studies by Benson and Kerley (2000) and Weisburd and Waring (2001) found the average age at initial involvement for whitecollar criminals to be around 40 years old. In an attempt to provide an explanation for this interesting phenomenon, Piquero and Benson (2004b) , drew on the findings of existing research (Weisburd, 1991; Weisburd & Waring, 2001; Wheeler et al., 1988) and noted the role of situational influences. Specifically, Piquero and Benson highlighted the potential of a crisis in an individual's personal or occupational life that could influence the decision to become involved in offending. This position is supported by earlier white-collar crime research, which emphasized a focus on the current life experiences of individuals for understanding motivational factors. Benson and Kerley (2000) clarified these points, as follows:
One searches in vain for early precursors or early hints of trouble in the life-history of the typical white-collar offender. For most of these individuals, their offences appear to come out of nowhere. Their crimes do not appear to be part of longstanding patterns of anti-social conduct, nor do they appear to be deeply rooted in a troubled social background … White collar crime appears to be more a function of adult life experiences as opposed to latent personality traits or a disturbed social background. (p. 133) These observations are mirrored in an everincreasing body of ICA research undertaken by the U.S. Secret Service together with the CERT Division based at Carnegie Mellon University. This research does not emphasize troubled histories of offenders or broken homes but rather focuses on current and situationally specific triggers that lead employees into crime. These groups have conducted a series of studies that highlight how an employee's relationship with his or her organization can often provoke ICA. For example, a 2005 CERT report studied 49 cases of insider sabotage, and in 88 percent of the cases, the perpetrator had a work-related grievance (Keeney et al., 2005) . In addition, various CERT reports have indicated how problems in one sphere of a person's life could influence another. In a report involving the banking and finance sector, for example, the CERT Division examined 23 ICA cases and found that in 27 percent of them, individuals were experiencing financial difficulties in their personal lives (Cappelli et al., 2004) . Cappelli et al. (2012) offered additional examples, highlighting the role of internal stressors (e.g., the threat of layoffs, disagreements over salary) and external stressors (e.g., family member with health problems, personal debt) in motivating ICA.
Further evidence has also pointed to "transitory" forces, as noted by Clarke and Cornish (1985) , and the need to consider how work/social life domains interact within the context of macro socio-economic forces. Transitory economic recessions can place financial pressures on families and businesses alike. For example, results from a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey indicated that levels of ICA may reflect the current economic climate (PwC, 2012) . Specifically, it emphasized that organizational data may be more at risk because of company lay-offs. When the same survey was conducted in 2009, 34 percent of European respondents believed that risks to company data had increased as a consequence of job losses. By 2011, this figure had risen to 42 percent. These figures are also echoed in a report by Ernst & Young (2010) , in which findings from a survey undertaken in 2009, a year after the emergence of the worldwide credit crunch, revealed that 25 percent of respondents had witnessed an increase in ICA.
This section, has illustrated how situational and transitory forces can be seen to originate from the related personal and occupational spheres which can be further influenced by macro socio-economic forces. This points to a considerably more complex picture of the potential motivations for ICA than has previously been considered in the IS security research. This then begs the question: how should such factors be identified and understood? The next section outlines such an approach.
Considering The Initial Involvement for ICA Through the LCP
Here, we propose the application of the LCP (Elder, 1994 (Elder, , 1998 to clarify the ICA motivational influences (located in box 1 of Figure 3 ; see also T-7 and T-6 per Figure 4) at the initial involvement stage. The LCP has its origins in sociology but has extended its reach to other disciplines, including social history (Modell, 1989) , developmental psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) , and gerontology (Streib & Binstock, 1990) . The LCP represents a substantial change in the study of people and their lives. Central to this examination is a focus on time, context, and process. LCP traditionally has considered three trajectories in individuals' lives: their education, work, and family. LCP research has studied the interdependency of these trajectories while considering how development in these trajectories is affected by historical/socio-economic forces and short-term transitions. These transitions (or events) can include factors such as commencing university studies, changing jobs, becoming unemployed, getting married, having a child, getting divorced, or experiencing bereavement from the death of a loved one.
Crucially, LCP is not a predictive theory, but rather a framework that can help conceptualize and study phenomena. Thus, Elder (1998) noted that the life course "defines a common field of inquiry by providing a framework that guides research on matters of problem identification and conceptual development" (p. 4). As depicted in Figure 5 , four key principles form the framework advanced by Giele and Elder (1998) : (1) time and place, (2) timing, (3) linked lives, and (4) human agency. We advance this framework as the basis for providing insights into the contemporary, transitory, and situational factors that motivate an individual to initial involvement in criminal behavior. We note how the relationship among the three trajectories of education, work, and family (and contemporary, transitory, and situational factors) can lead an individual into a fourth trajectory-crime.
Next, we discuss each of the four principles and provide illustrations of their applications in LCP research. Given the absence of IS security research focusing on the factors that influence initial involvement in ICA, we also draw on white-collar crime research as a means to illustrate how the framework could be applied to the IS security field.
One major advantage of applying the LCP framework to IS security research is that it provides a lens through which to conceptualize influential factors and understand the relationships amongst them, just as applied to white-collar crime.
We justify the use of the white-collar crime literature by arguing that the line between white-collar crime and ICA is increasingly blurred. This blurring is due to the proliferation of computers and their use by whitecollar employees. A similar argument is provided by Weisburd and Waring (2001) who note:
[C]hanges in our society … have placed the opportunity for white-collar crimes in the hands of a much broader class of Americans, most of them who were excluded from these activities in the past. In part, the rapid growth of white-collar jobs in America in the last fifty years had spawned such changes (Bell, 1973) . But perhaps even more important are the dramatic differences in the way modern society functions. The advent of the computer, for example, gives large numbers of people access to the documents and transactions that are so much a part of whitecollar illegalities. (p. 11)
Principle One: Time and Place
The principle of time and place states that "the life course of individuals is embedded in and shaped by the historical times and places they experience over their lifetime" (Elder, 1998, p. 3) . Differences in when individuals are born exposes them to varied historical worlds. These worlds offer both constraints and opportunities, which are reflected in the individuals' lives. The influences of specific historical times and places on people take the form of a cohort effect, in which successive cohorts reflect the historical epochs through which they live. An example of this principle is provided by Zhou and Hou (1999) , who studied the effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) on Chinese youth. During this period, a large number of Chinese youths experienced being "sent down," a process that involved separation from their families and communities and being forced to undertake manual labor. Such an experience had a profound effect on the life course of these youths and differentiated this specific cohort from successive groups that did not experience the same fate.
The principle of time and place provides insight into how influential factors may emerge depending on the historical epoch. This principle has been illustrated in recent years with that widespread organizational layoffs, resulting from the recent global downturn. The influence of macro socio-economic forces has also been discussed in a series of white-collar crime
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Figure 5. Four Key Principles in the LCP Framework, adapted from Giele and Elder (1998)
studies (Benson & Moore, 1992; Wheeler, 1992) . Indeed, Benson and Moore (1992) argued that during economic prosperity, an ever-present opportunity for an employee to embezzle may remain just that-an opportunity. However, a recession may influence the employee to consider crime to make ends meet. For example, his or her partner may become unemployed, forcing a reinterpretation of the opportunity and the enactment of embezzlement. Accordingly, Benson and Moore concluded that any theory of white-collar crime must consider macro socio-economic forces due to their potential to influence initial involvement in crime.
Principle Two: Timing
The second principle of timing states that "the developmental impact of a succession of life transitions or events is contingent on when they occur in a person's life" (Elder, 1987, p. 3) . The study by Elder (1987) of men from Oakland, California, who were mobilized to fight in World War II, provides an illustration of this principle. The study found that the effect of mobilization depended on the men's life stage. For instance, early entrants-those who entered the military before they were 21 years oldexperienced little disruption in their life course. Of this group, few were married or in a steady relationship when mobilized. For late entrants-those who entered the military at ages 22 or older-the picture was far different. These men were three times as likely to be living with a wife compared with the early entrants. Late army entrants also experienced greater disruption regarding work. Many of these men already had established a career prior to being called up, which was not the case for early entrants. Indeed, many of the early entrants used the opportunities offered by the G.I. Bill, post-war, to enter college and then establish a career.
In the organizational domain, the principle of timing can be illustrated by examining the relationship between threats to an employee's job security (Kinnunen et al., 1999; Sverke & Hellgren, 2002) and the employee's life stage. As time passes, an employee's identity may change to that of breadwinner (Thébaud, 2010; Warren, 2007) . A breadwinner is likely to accrue additional financial responsibilities in the form of a mortgage, new car, child care, and schooling fees. In her study of ICT workers, Kelan (2008) noted how the extra financial burden breadwinners experience led to them to place a greater emphasis on job security. However, job security was not such a priority for unmarried individuals who had no children and, therefore, fewer financial responsibilities. Parallels can be drawn here with the work of Charles and James (2003) , who studied the relationship between job insecurity and work orientations for men and women. Based on interviews with staff from three different employment sectors (manufacturing, public, retail), they noted that the significance of paid work for each respondent affected their attitudes towards job security. Highlighting the importance of employment stability, for example, one respondent stated the following:
When I was single, when I first started here I was single, it didn't matter to me if this place closed or not. Because I had no dependents. I didn't have to-there was just myself I was taking care of. And when you get married and you get a house and you have got a mortgage and a couple of kids come along-that's the difference. (p. 252) This research illustrated that employees react differently to a firm's financial problems and the ensuing threats to job security. Notably, these reactions depend on their life stages and their marital/familial responsibilities. In extreme cases, in a bid to ensure the family's financial stability, a breadwinner may resort to ICA. Supporting evidence for this assertion comes from studies in which convicted white-collar offenders were interviewed about the motives for their offenses (Klenowski et al., 2011; Willot et al., 2001 ). In the study by Willot et al. (2001) , for example, four offenders described as upper-middle class discussed not only their own financial responsibilities, but also those of the employees who worked for them. This factor is illustrated in the following excerpt from an offenders' group discussion:
Francis: If it had just been me, I don't think … there would probably have been no need, to, to have to dig into these funds because … Lawrence: I agree, if I was a single person, I
would just have walked away, it wouldn't have concerned one.
Rupert: Yeah, I think that is a strong factor, because although my family's grown up now, at the time this happened, I had a young family. Then you look to your staff, who in turn have got their responsibilities and young families themselves. (p. 450)
Principle Three: Linked Lives
The third principle of linked lives asserts that "lives are lived interdependently, and social and historical influences are expressed through this network of shared relationships" (Elder, 1998, p. 4) . Of some significance, these shared relationships are not trajectory specific but rather cross the boundaries of education, work, and family life. The fact that these relationships are not trajectory specific enables consideration of how these areas of life can influence each other. Drawing on this principle, Bailey et al. (2004) conducted a grounded theory study which explored how dual-earner households make decisions about migration with respect to home and work tasks. Specifically, in terms of home tasks, they looked at how couples manage their caring responsibilities for their own children and elderly parents. Bailey et al. noted the following:
What emerges, then, is the view that (im)mobility is influenced by how household networks trigger, enable and constrain migration, and that the strength of these networks over space and time affects the balance of enabling and constraining factors. When local linkages are not strong, families move to be near parents, even if this requires adjustments to employment careers. However, when local linkages are strong, elderly parents are moved to be near their children. (p.
1628)
The breadwinner example also helps to demonstrate the principle of linked lives, in that the LCP affords consideration of how the spheres of work and personal life may influence each other. With the case of the breadwinner, it is clear how changes in an employee's personal life may affect decisions in the work environment. Wheeler (1992) provides another example, noting how white-collar criminals are not always driven by the desire for more; rather, they often seek simply to maintain what they have. Speculating in a previous study, Weisburd (1991) noted that, [certain potential offenders] would be reasonably happy with the place they have achieved through conventional means if only they could keep that place. But the fate of organizational success and failure, or the changing nature of the economy in their line of work may put them at least temporarily under great financial pressure, where they risk losing the lifestyle that they have achieved. They may perceive this situation as a short-term threat that can be met through shortterm fraud-a temporary taking to be restored as soon as their business fortunes turn around. The motivation for their crime is not selfish ego gratification, but rather the fear of falling-of losing what they have worked so hard to gain. (p. 189)
Wheeler's argument is supported by a number of self-report studies, which have found that the motive for white-collar crime is sometimes the desire to maintain what has been achieved through hard work as opposed to greed and the desire for more (Benson, 1985; Denzin, 1977) . Rothman and Gandossy (1982) , for instance, provided an example of a man who co-owned a building business with his brothers. He preferred to leave the bookkeeping to his siblings; then one day, they informed him that it had been essential to commit white-collar crime offenses to keep their company afloat. Although shocked and angered by the news, the man did not report his brothers' actions. Rather, concerned about the economic welfare of his family, he decided that complicity was the best course of action.
Principle Four: Human Agency
The fourth and final LCP principle is that of human agency. This principle states that "individuals construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take within the opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstances" (Elder, 1998, p. 4) . Gong et al. (2011) examined this principle in terms of how human agency can influence the relationship between migration and mental health. Specifically, they studied human agency in terms of the reasons for migration, the extent to which the migration was planned, and whether the migration was voluntary or involuntary (e.g., a refugee fleeing from war and seeking political asylum). Of particular interest to the researchers was the extent to which the exercise of human agency before migration influenced the mental well-being of the migrants once they had moved and were attempting to adapt to their new country of residence. Using a sample of Asian immigrants who migrated to the US between 2002 and 2003, the study produced two major findings. First, individuals who had a number of strong reasons to move were less likely to experience mental health problems compared with those who lacked a clear rationale. Secondly, there were psychological benefits for those who carefully planned their migration. Gong et al. (2011) argued that planning-the accumulation of financial resources, acquiring language training, and establishing new social networks-lessened the distress of the move and reduced the likelihood of mental disorders.
The principle of human agency appears well suited to a discussion of white-collar crime in which offenders and potential offenders are considered rational decision makers (Benson & Cullen, 1988; Weisburd et al., 1995) . In addition, white-collar crime research has noted how social circumstances are influenced by historical socio-economic forces; that is, such influences may be present in one period but not in others. As discussed, Benson and Moore (1992) argued that any theory of white-collar crime must consider macro social and economic forces due to their influence on the decision-making process of offenders. They asserted that when an economy is buoyant, an employee may be aware of an everpresent embezzlement opportunity, but it may remain simply a notion or passing temptation. However, a recession could influence the employee's firm negatively, threatening the employee's job security and forcing him or her to reconsider the embezzlement opportunity.
Aside from the arguments made by Benson and Moore (1992) , several other studies of offender accounts have highlighted the influence of historical and social circumstances and their influence on the decision-making of white-collar criminals (e.g., Benson, 1985; Klenowski et al., 2011; Rothman & Gandossy, 1982) . In keeping with our discussion of breadwinning (see Principle Two: Timing), Klenowski et al. (2011) 
The Future of ICA Research
Although ICA remains a major threat for businesses, as noted, the response from IS security researchers has been relatively modest, leaving many compelling opportunities for further research. Although, recent IS security research has urged a greater focus on the insider threat (Crossler et al., 2013; Lowry et al., 2017a; Mahmood et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013; Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013) , the vast bulk of this research is focused on policy noncompliance with noncriminal violations (e.g., Barlow et al., 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 2013; D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Guo & Yuan, 2012; Guo et al., 2011; Hsu et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance et al., 2015) . Although noncriminal behaviors are indeed important to study, criminal behaviors can be particularly damaging to organizations and thus need greater focus in the literature. In a bid to address the need for more and better ICA research, this paper embraces two aims: (1) to demonstrate an exciting gap in extant IS security research, via the RCP; and (2) to introduce the LCP for studying the motivations for ICA.
First, it is clear the extant research has focused almost solely on factors influencing an individual's decision regarding intent for ICA. However, such research has overlooked another key stage in the criminal decision-making process: Through the application of the RCP, we illustrate that the key missing opportunity in ICA research is to consider those motivational factors that could lead to initial involvement and a state of readiness. This omission has led us to advance a revised version of the ESAC we call the Two-Stage Decision-making Process for ICA. Second, we aim to advance and demonstrate the application of a framework based on the LCP, which can assist researchers in identifying these motivational factors at the initial involvement stage.
As can be seen through our discussion of the four LCP principles, this approach enables a dynamic perspective for considering the motivations that influence the decision to participate in criminal behavior. First, regarding the principle of time and place, the perspective affords insight into how influential factors may emerge depending on the historical epoch. Second, the principle of timing helps to examine how a specific event may affect individuals differently, depending on their life stage. Third, the principle of linked lives fosters consideration of how the spheres of work and personal life may influence each other. Fourth, the principal of human agency encourages understanding of how individuals' life courses are constructed as they make choices about criminal behavior. These choices reflect the current realities and opportunities of historical and social circumstances.
Embracing and integrating the RCP and LCP into IS security research should not only cause a major shift in the theoretical lens that focuses on ICA, but also open up previously hidden avenues of compelling research. We thus conclude by offering further thoughts on what these perspectives should mean for future research. We first argue that the concepts we have introduced in this essay cannot be waved off as mere covariates of ICA. Next, we discuss how the LCP and RCP can provide insight not only regarding the initial-involvement, but also the event stage of the offender decision-making process.
The LCP Requires More Than Mere Covariates
Given the extant trend in IS security research to focus on intentions to commit ICA and to address counter-explanations as covariates, we warn against treating the concepts we have introduced as mere covariates. For example, modelling intentions to commit ICA with demographics of marital status, organization's economic status, and personal financial pressure, does not properly leverage the LCP. Such factors first need to be explained first in terms of offender readiness, which is a key missing construct in the IS literature that temporally precedes intentions and has unique antecedents; crucially, readiness is not a covariate of intentions. Although hints of these interrelationships can be found in the literature, only the LCP can provide an explanation of how they are related and why. Notably, most current IS security models are cross-sectional in nature and do not consider temporal influences, let alone the crucial missing link of readiness and the life events that encourage readiness. Some may argue that focusing only on intention with its covariates provides theoretical concision; however, we argue that such "concision" misrepresents the reality of ICA. Thus, new models are needed that consider temporal influence of the events leading up to actual ICA.
Complementary to these models, ICA researchers need to expand their methodological and measurement repertoire to study these phenomena. The current common practice of using one-off surveys or hypothetical vignettes are likely to come up short in effectively studying our two-stage eventbased model. We thus believe it is crucial that ICA researchers turn to longitudinal data collections; otherwise, our proposed timeline of events cannot be properly studied or measured in a causal manner. To do so, ICA researchers will likely need to follow truly longitudinal event studies conducted in Sociology and in Criminology, which often take place over years, not months. In doing so, greater care needs to be taken for triangulating measurement with actual events rather than solely relying on participants selfreporting. Such studies would definitely need to involve participants (i.e., employees) responding to questions about life events and their ICA behaviors, but for improved data, manager reports on the employees' behaviors would also be needed.
Another promising avenue of research would be to better leverage big-data analytics methods (Lowry et al., 2017a) to better understand life events and organizational events that might act as triggers that foster motivations and readiness to commit ICA. Although there would be ethical concerns with such research and practice that would need to be carefully addressed, organizations have already used legal, predictive analytics on their employees to predict factors such as who is most likely to leave their employment prematurely. Organizations would not be privy to all key life events that could trigger ICA, but they are legally privy to some that could be studied in a consistent, predictive manner (e.g., change in marital status, surviving a round of layoffs in a department, credit score changes, change in number of family dependents, and poor work reviews).
Advancing RCP and LCP for Understanding Offender Decision-Making at the Event Stage
Here, we urge IS security researchers to look beyond intentions and consider the decision-making and actual behaviors involved in the perpetration of ICA. As noted, intention is often used a proxy for behavior, but we argue that this leads to misplaced assumptions about the ICA commission process, which belie its complexity. Although we have concentrated on the motivations for ICA at the initial involvement stage, we also propose that the LCP and RCP can provide much needed clarity in terms of what to research at the event stage by examining opportunities for ICA. We discuss these next.
In discussing white-collar crimes, Piquero and Benson (2004a) argued that offences may be "situationally dependent" on two levels. First, and consistent with our arguments, they noted that an individual may experience a crisis in their work or personal life that motivates the commission of a white-collar crime (e.g., financial strain due to bankruptcy or divorce). However, they also noted that white collar-offending may be situationally dependent in the sense that the opportunity to offend may not come about until they have secured a certain occupational position. They emphasized that, unlike street offenders, the opportunities for white-collar criminals are not ubiquitous or so democratically distributed. Rather, access to opportunities are shaped by the occupational position undertaken by an employee and the structure of the organization in which an employee works.
As an illustration, an accountant may perceive an opportunity for embezzlement, which can be executed through the use of his/her company's online book-keeping system. Due to his/her access to and knowledge of the book-keeping system, which arose from the nature of his/her position, the accountant may perceive an embezzlement opportunity; yet, it is unlikely that a marketing employee from the same company would equally view the booking-keeping system as offering them an opportunity for embezzlement. Given his/her different position, the marketing employee would likely not have access to the company accounts or know how to use the online book-keeping software. In this sense, organizations play an important role in shaping what is termed the opportunity structure -that is, how a specific context may offer/deny opportunities, depending on the individual.
When considering these two aspects of situational dependency in terms of the LCP, the latter may also help to explain why white-collar and ICA offenders commit their offences at a later stage of their life course, when compared with juvenile delinquents or street offenders. A key point is that the LCP affords consideration of the inter-play between trajectories and how events in one may have implications for another and lead to the initial involvement in crime. Previously law-abiding individuals who have assimilated the trappings and behaviors of the middle-class may be following conventional trajectories in their work and family life. Many such individuals may have academic degrees and worked hard to attain their occupational positions. Achieving these goals takes time and represent periods of conformity to general society. Yet a crisis in their work or family life may lead them to consider crime as a solution to their newly developed needs. Given the previous conventional course of the trajectories followed by such individuals, this leads them to resorting to crime at a much later stage in their life, when compared with juvenile delinquents, who will commence criminal activities in their teenage years. Therefore, without consideration of the inter-play between the different life course trajectories, it is difficult to conceptualize the factors which lead to the initial involvement and later the perpetration of whitecollar/ICA offenses in the event stage.
The manner in which the environment shapes potential opportunities for crime, is also consistent with the RCP. Regarding their initial involvement model, Clarke and Cornish argued that if an offender decides that criminal actions are the best means to satisfy their needs, then they will have reached a state of readiness. Thus, it is only after an individual has reached this state, that, at a later date, they will select an opportunity and perpetrate a specific crime in the event stage. Such opportunities will be selected based on the associated costs and benefits. Notably, the RCP adopts a crime-specific approach for understanding why certain opportunities are acted on and not others. To help elucidate the factors that an offender considers when undertaking this costbenefit analysis, Cornish and Clarke (1987) advanced the concept of "choice-structuring" properties. Such properties relate to not only the offense, but also the offender. Therefore, in terms of specific offenses, factors can include the type of crime, type and amount of payoff, perceived risk, skills required, and so on. These in turn will be considered by the offender regarding their own goals, motives, experiences, abilities, expertise and preferences. Given the nature of the relationship between offense and offender, choice structuring properties help to explain the basis on which opportunities are selected and why certain offenses will be differentially attractive to some offenders and not others. There is a notable overlap here with Piquero and Benson (2004a) who noted the importance of how organizations play a role in "structuring" opportunities for potential offenders, but Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 943 ) take this one step further, by highlighting the choice-structuring properties of the individual:
. . .the term "choice-structuring property" is a relational concept designed to provide an analytic tool for increasing an understanding of the interaction between person variables and arrays of behaviors -in the case of crime, to specify more closely offenders as well as the offenses they commit. (p. 943)
The above insights from the LCP and RCP emphasize the complexity of the commission process and the close relationship between offender and offense. It is clear that a focus on behavior in the commission process is required. A continued focus on intention, without an appreciation of how an offence is chosen, will perpetuate a myopic understanding of the problem.
Conclusion
In this manuscript, we challenge the existing body of research in criminal organizational (ICA), which we assert has too narrowly focused on factors that influence either ICA intentions or actual behavior during the commission process. The key unaddressed opportunity in ICA is conceptualizing, measuring, and testing the decision-making processes involved in ICA. We demonstrate this opportunity by leveraging the RCP from criminology, which newly introduced the idea of an initial involvement stage, which encompasses those factors that lead an individual to consider participation in ICA. Importantly, RCP argues that if, during the initial involvement stage, an individual becomes motivated and decides that future ICA behavior is the most suitable course of action, then he or she will have reached a state of readiness. It is only after an individual has become readied, and at a later time, that the individual makes event decisions in the perpetration of a specific crime. As the extant research has not considered the initial involvement stage, or the idea of readiness, we propose a revised version of the ESAC, which reflects these criminal decision-making stages.
Another contribution of our work is to further consider what exactly happens to people who develop motivations or needs that would lead to readiness. Again, extant ICA research is silent on these motivational triggers. Accordingly, we draw on the LCP. With a focus on time, context, and process, the LCP offers a framework with four key principles. Through the LCP, we can better understand why white-collar crimes, like ICA, often occur later in one's life. For example, it might require a key event such as financial strain during an ugly divorce, with a combination of one's access to opportunities through their work position (e.g., system authorization that could allow for embezzlement) that provide motivation that leads to readiness. Through examples drawn from the LCP and white-collar crime literature, we illustrate how these principles can provide a basis for conceptualizing factors that motivate ICA and open up new avenues for future research/theory development. We conclude by providing an outline of exciting research opportunities based on the RCP and LCP.
